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BOOK REVIEWS
LIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A REVIEW OF
JOHN HART ELY'S ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND
John D. Feerick*
I was privileged to be asked by the editors of the Notre Dame Law
Review to review Professor John Hart Ely's book, On Constitutional
Ground.' I was surprised by the invitation, however, since I have not
been actively engaged in the discussions of the academy on the role of
the Supreme Court, or more precisely, what theory of constitutional
interpretation should be used by the Court in discharging its review-
ing function. I confess that I initially thought the invitation was in-
tended for one of the several constitutional law theorists on my
school's faculty. When I realized that I did not have an "out" on this
ground, I concluded that I had little choice but to take on the chal-
lenge of reviewing this book by one of the formidable constitutional
theorists of this century. If anything, I wanted to prove to myself that
Professor Ely's observation about law school deans is wrong (I'm not
sure I succeeded!): "As they approach middle age, law professors tend
to deny their dwindling creativity by becoming deans . .. or some
other form ofjackanapes."2
Having read the book twice, and certain parts more than that, I
am glad I had the opportunity to do this review, even if it did ruin my
summer, so to speak. I put it this way because I quickly became ab-
sorbed in the subjects treated in the book and was tempted to reach
out for the other writings of the author referred to throughout the
* I acknowledge the special assistance I received from Griffin Reidy, a student at
Fordham Law School, with respect to the 1996/97 term of the Supreme Court; and
other assistance from my colleagues, Robert Cooper, Esq., Michele Falkow, Esq., and
Mr. Gregory Blackman.
1 JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND (1996) [hereinafter GROUND].
2 Id. at 474 n.10.
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book. I particularly recommend this book for anyone who has an in-
terest in becoming more engaged in the tantalizing constitutional and
non-constitutional issues of our day, and certainly for anyone who fol-
lows or would like to know more aboutJohn Hart Ely. The book is an
especially good introduction for anyone seeking to be brought up to
date on issues of constitutional law. It is masterful in accomplishing
that purpose. I need to caution, however, that the book is not easy to
read or, for that matter, to review because it deals with an extraordi-
nary number of subjects; indeed, it almost runs the gamut of an entire
law school curriculum.
Consider the subjects treated in the book's carefully written and
meticulously footnoted 507 pages: federalism, separation of powers,
freedom of expression, religious freedom, criminal procedure, racial
discrimination, substantive due process, candor, and many other sub-
jects within each of these broad categories. More specifically, the au-
thor touches on such interesting subjects as President Clinton's use-
inappropriate as he sees it-of the Constitution to abolish the mili-
tary's ban on gays and the President's exercise of military force in Bos-
nia, Haiti, and Somalia; whether a President can be indicted prior to
being impeached; the importance of the "reasonable doubt standard"
despite the "unsettling outcome" of the OJ. Simpson trial in Los An-
geles; the high standards that should apply to educational institutions
in the conduct of student discipline; the shortcomings of the English
Rule against contempt of court limiting what the media can publish
concerning the administration ofjustice; the French system of investi-
gating crimes; the incompleteness of certain aspects of the Warren
Commission Report because of its dependence on the government'
then existing investigative agencies; the use of lies to gain career ad-
vancement, with particular comments on Justice Clarence Thomas
and Professor Anita Hill; and the "futility" of believing that Supreme
Court nominees can be judged "on anything other than their
politics."
I found especially well done Professor Ely's treatment of the Con-
stitution's bill of attainder provision 3 and his analysis of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Lovett,4 which struck down a con-
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4 328 U.S. 303 (1946). His fascination for the bill of attainder appears to have
developed in law school and then reached its pinnade when he clerked for Chief
Justice Warren. As a clerk, he contributed to the Court's decision in United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), which invalidated a congressional statute based on the
bill of attainder provision. See Professor Ely's treatment of the subject in Note, The
Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72
YA. LJ. 330 (1962).
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gressional statute prohibiting federal money from being used to pay
the salary of three individuals named in the law. I recommend for
every trial advocacy teacher, as well as other members of the academic
community, his incisive step-by-step critique of the case strategy and
development of United States v. Lovett. I also found splendid his chap-
ters on freedom of expression and religious freedom and his treat-
ment of reverse discrimination and affirmative action.5 There is much
in these chapters for contemporary America, though the material in-
cluded was actually written in the context of the 1960s and 1970s.
I must admit, however, to having had difficulty working through
parts of the chapter on federalism dealing with the "irrepressible" Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins and choice-of-law theorizing.7 Interestingly, he
anticipated that possibility by noting his own difficulty in finding en-
forceable principles of federalism. But he is not ambiguous about
where he is going because he expresses a strong preference for leav-
ing more subjects to state regulation and for the Supreme Court
"keeping the federal government from attaining plenary legislative
power."8 I found his views on criminal procedure to be powerfully
presented with respect to the exclusionary rule and the need to recon-
sider the decision in Harris v. New York,9 which allowed incriminatory
statements made without a lawyer to be admitted into evidence. His
sensitivities to the rights of criminal defendants are manifested
throughout the book. He comments on the need for judges to take
steps to ensure the integrity of trials in the face of prejudicial public-
ity, deplores the Supreme Court's cutback on post-conviction reme-
5 GROUND, supra note 1, at 188-97, 247-78.
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Professor Ely persuasively argues that when a matter is
covered by a Federal Rule, the relevant reference point in determining whether state
or federal law applies should be the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and not Erie. His
discussion of that Act and various Supreme Court cases (including Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965)) is quite helpful. See GROUND, supra note 1, at 50-61.
7 He casts a cold eye on the view that "states have a greater interest in advancing
the interests of their own than they have in advancing the interests of outsiders."
GROUND, supra note 1, at 65. He therefore rejects a choice-of-law system based on that
premise and instead expresses a preference for the law of a common domicile or the
joint law of the domiciles of the plaintiff and defendant. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Choice of
Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
8 GROUND, supra note 1, at 32-33.
9 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see GRoUND, supra note 1, at 211-30. My colleague, Pro-
fessor James Kainen, joins Professor Ely in making a strong case for eliminating the
impeachment exception to Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), finding that
"the scope of exclusionary rules ... raises meaningful normative questions about the
constitutional integrity of the criminal process and not the unavoidable evidentiary
costs of that integrity." James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Policies, Principles and Politics, 44 STAN. L. R . 1301, 1372 (1992).
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dies, and urges that at the time of guilty pleas judges should make a
thorough inquiry into the facts and bargains. I was touched by his
defense of public defenders, with which I agree, and found poignant
his search for the Bay Harbor Poolroom, the site of Gideon's alleged
burglary. His latter treatment, as well as other parts of the book, sug-
gest to me that Professor Ely has a literary talent that may one day
express itself in a prize-winning novel or two-not unlike John
Grisham's stories of the law.
His views on the subject of flag desecration were prescient given
that they preceded by fifteen years the Supreme Court's decisions in
Texas v. Johnson'° and United States v. Eichman.11 "Orthodoxy of
thought," he declared, "can be fostered not simply by placing unusual
restrictions on 'deviant' expression but also by granting unusual pro-
tection to expression that is officially acceptable."' 2 Compare Justice
Brennan's statement for the Court injohnson: "We are tempted to say,
in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in our community
will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today,"' 3 and his
statement in Eichman: "Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the
very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth
revering."14
Professor Ely's postscripts and commentaries throughout the
book are worth the purchase price. In addition, the book contains a
number of interesting anecdotes which I have not seen elsewhere.
For example, he mentions a time when he recommended a female law
clerk to Chief Justice Warren, a recommendation to which the Chief
listened with restraint and then "noted (among other things) that he
worked very closely with his clerks and wondered what this might put
her (and others) in a position to accuse him of."15 Ever apologetic for
the Chief, whom he greatly admired, Professor Ely adds, "[H] e was
seventy-three years old and thus no one would listen to charges of
sexual impropriety anyhow .... -16 He also records an encounter with
Justice Tom Clark concerning the subject of bills of attainder. Justice
Clark, who dissented in United States v. Brown,'7 said to him while the
case was pending: "A bill of attainder! What on earth is a bill of attain-
10 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
11 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
12 GROUND, supra note 1, at 186.
13 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
14 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319.
15 GROUND, supra note 1, at 335.
16 Id.
17 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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der?"18 Professor Ely responded that he ought to know since he had
written many opinions rejecting bill of attainder claims, to which Jus-
tice Clark responded, "Yes, but remember what my opinions said: 'It is
also argued that this is a bill of attainder. It is not.'
1 9
Professor Ely also shows in the course of the book that there are
limits to a law clerk's persuasive powers when it comes to a Supreme
Court Justice. This is illustrated by an excerpt from a memorandum
he wrote to Chief Justice Warren concerning United States v. Seeger,
which was decided on a theory Professor Ely "derided" in the memo-
randum.20 Also included is a memorandum he sent to Chief Justice
Warren concerning Griswold v. Connecticut, urging that the law in ques-
tion not be invalidated on the basis of a violation of a general right of
privacy.21 He notes that the Chief Justice "didn't buy a word" of his
advice and "went along with the Court's right to privacy line."22
A philosophical and humanist strand runs throughout the book,
much of which resonated with my own sense of life. Thus, in the sec-
tion on lying to gain career advancement, he quotes from a letter he
sent to The New York Times in 1988: "Why can't we have a world in
which accurate pictures of people are permissible, but making mis-
takes is too?"23 With respect to complaints that "nothing can work"
and that "no successful theory is possible," he observes:
The message... will be that courts needn't hang themselves up on
niceties like principled decision-making. Perhaps the new realists
find reassurance in that sea of idealistic young faces peering back
over the student benches. I find less in a truly realistic appraisal of
the ideology that is likely to issue from those faces when they've
grown old enough to peer over judicial benches. 24
18 GROUND, supra note 1, at 414 n.176.
19 Id.
20 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The case involved a provision of a federal statute which
excused training and service for a person "by reason of religious training and belief"
who was conscientiously opposed to participation in war. In the excerpt contained in
the book, Professor Ely urged that the Court not attempt to review the facts or define
religion, God, and Supreme Being. GROUND, supra note 1, at 188-89. He felt that the
law should have been invalidated because of a violation of the principle of neutrality
by favoring a particular religion over another religion or religion over non-religion.
See id.
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The case involved the constitutionality of a Connecticut
statute which proscribed the sale and use of drugs and medical instruments for birth
control purposes, as well as advice by physicians concerning birth control. The Court,
in finding the statute unconstitutional, grounded its decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the existence of a marital right of privacy.
22 GROUND, supra note 1, at 281.
23 Id. at 338.
24 Id. at 364-65.
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And as for those of us who are their teachers, what could possibly be
the joy in a life devoted to reiterating that nothing will work?
The format of the book is rather unique. It moves forward imme-
diately without the usual preface and foreward or hint as to what is to
come, except as divined from the Table of Contents. What unfolds
are excerpts from a published book, articles, speeches, and other writ-
ings of the author, as well as excerpts from papers and memoranda he
wrote in law school and as a law clerk and government official, unpub-
lished until now. He also includes published and unpublished letters,
congressional testimony of his, and a fan letter he sent to several
members of the Supreme Court commenting on the Court's decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.25 The book is exceptionally rich with
the author's perspectives and insights. It reflects an extraordinary
mind, a superb writer, a deep thinker, a seeker of what is right and
just, and a person with a very good sense of humor and a wonderful
compassion for the underdog and disadvantaged. In a very real sense
the book is John Hart Ely's autobiography of the past almost forty
years of his professional life. It has a "swan song" quality to it, though
I know he is far from that, given his age (younger than I), mind,
heart, and present commitments.
I suspect that each of us has a book like this within our dreams
simply as a way of recording, modestly if that is possible, what we are
most proud of in our life. In the case ofJohn Hart Ely, he has lived, in
Holmes's expression, greatly in the law and responded "philosoph-
ically" and "self-sacrificing enough" to Holmes's call for a treatment of
subjects that unifies "the entire body of law."26 He has enjoyed a. re-
markable career: as a summer associate with Abe Fortas and the op-
portunity to help develop the strategy and brief in Gideon v.
Wainwright27 service as a military policeman upon his graduation
from Yale Law School in 1963; a position on the staff of the Warren
Commission that investigated the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy; a clerkship with Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 1964-
65 term; a year as a Fulbright Scholar at the London School of Eco-
25 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although opposed to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
410 U.S. 113 (1973), he applauds the Casey Court for standing by that decision lest it
"weaken the Court's authority immeasurably." See GROUND, supra note 1, at 305.
26 Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing C.G. ADDISON, THE LAW
OF TORTS (1870)).
27 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In that case, the Court gave expression to the rule that
persons accused of crimes are entitled to counsel in both capital and non-capital
cases. A most thoughtful memorandum of that experience is quoted from in the
book. GROUND, supra note 1, at 198-203. It is a stellar example for today's law stu-
dents of legal analysis, writing, and advocacy.
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nomics; and several years as a public defender and co-founder of San
Diego Defenders, Inc. In 1968 he launched his career in academia as
an associate professor at Yale Law School. This was followed by a pro-
fessorship at Harvard Law School in 1973, a brief period of service as
general counsel of the United States Department of Transportation, a
return to Harvard as the Ralph S. TylerJr. Professor of Constitutional
Law, and then selection as dean and Richard E. Lang Professor at
Stanford Law School in 1982. Since 1996, he has occupied the Rich-
ard A. Hausler Professorship at the University of Miami Law School.
John Hart Ely's influence and writings have been profound and
monumental. There can be no question that he contributed greatly
to the Supreme Court's decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright 28 and United
States v. Brown,29 gave exemplary public service in San Diego and for
the United States Department of Transportation, and helped shape
the debate on constitutional theory since his 1980 book, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review.30 His writings before and after this
landmark work may not have been acclaimed to the same extent, but
are significant and important benchmarks of their own, particularly
when addressing the use of motivation in constitutional interpreta-
tion,3 ' substantive due process against the backdrop of Roe v. Wade,32
and the war-making powers of the Constitution.33 Whatever one's
point of view on the Constitution might be, Professor Ely has been in
the forefront trying to find and articulate the proper role of the
Supreme Court vis-a-vis other parts of government. He has led, edu-
cated, challenged, and provoked, earning for himself a special place
in the American legal profession.34
28" 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
30 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
31 See his seminal article,John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970).
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973); seeJohn Hart Ely, The Wages of Clying WofY A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973).
33 The author develops these themes fully in his book, JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
REsPONSIBaU. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AN rS AFTRmATH (1993). My
colleague, Professor William Michael Treanor, draws on this book for his article, Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 695 (1997). While agreeing with Ely's pro-Congress reading of the war-making
power, Professor Treanor adds much to the discussion by developing the proposition
that "the Founders gave Congress the power to start war because they believed that
Presidents, out of a desire for personal glory, would be too prone to war." Id. at 772.
34 For one example of his influence on a new generation of academics, see the
articles by Professor Treanor on the Takings Clause of the Constitution, in which he
urges greater deference to the legislative process, with special protections for discrete
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Because it is not possible in the limited scope of a review to cover
all of the ground contained in this enormous book, I will content my-
self to offer comments on only a few of the subjects, including as I go
references to perspectives of some of my colleagues on the Fordham
Law faculty. Finally, I will end by testing how well the views of John
Hart Ely have stood up in the most recent term of the United States
Supreme Court, recognizing, as Ely does, that there is an ebb and flow
in the history of the Court and in the nation of which it is a central
part. As Professor Ely notes, even if one's views fall to gain accept-
ance, the effort to do so "is enough to fill a person's heart."3 5
I. ELY'S GENERAL THEORY
Professor Ely suggests that the role of courts is to protect rights
that are "designated with some specificity in a constitutional docu-
ment," to protect rights of political access with respect to open-ended
provisions of the Constitution such as the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
to ensure that the rights of minorities are "not to be treated by a set of
rules different from that which the majority has prescribed for it-
self."3 6 His emphasis is on access rights and equality rights, eschewing
a role for the Court in protecting "society's fundamental values" or
identifying constitutionally "unstated fundamental principles of sub-
stantivejustice." 37 He confesses scepticism that a small group, such as
the members of the Supreme Court, have the right answers to ques-
tions of public policy, or better answers than those that emerge in our
legislative bodies. While acknowledging that the deliberations of leg-
islative bodies are far from perfect, he believes that "nonetheless our
democratic system is one that is in various ways programmed, at least
roughly, to register intensities of preference."38 Courts, he urges,
should protect the opportunity of citizens "to participate in politics
and political decisions" by leaving the product of their decisions
alone. In doing so, he suggests, courts "enhance[ ] the autonomy" of
citizens and put them in a position where they can "behave morally."39
He thus says to courts:
and insular minorities. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narra-
tives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1151 (1997); William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Pro-
cess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995).
35 GROUND, supra note 1, at 365.
36 Id. at 7.
37 Id. at 8, 24.
38 Id. at 14.
39 I& at 9.
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Enforce those rights that have inspired sufficient popular consensus
to secure a place in the document. Enforce those rights that are
needed to let us all freely and equally register our preferences. En-
force for minorities those rights that the majority has seen fit to
guarantee for itself. Enforce all those rights with all the vigor you
can muster. But beyond that, you simply have no right in a democ-
racy-no more than philosophers or law professors or anyone else
has-to tell the rest of us that we have made a mistake and that you
know better.4°
Ely's representation-reinforcing approach or process-perfecting
theory has provoked enormous commentary over the past almost two
decades. This commentary is admirably captured in Symposium on De-
mocracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later 41 and in my colleague Professor
James E. Fleming's thoughtful article, Constructing the Substantive Con-
stitution.42 As noted there, critics have charged Professor Ely with a
flight from substance.
Fleming takes issue with some of the criticism, arguing that Ely
does not flee from substantive political theory because his is "a pro-
cess-perfecting theory that perfects processes in virtue of its substan-
tive basis in a political theory of representative democracy."4 3
Fleming, however, does agree with the criticism that Professor Ely fails
to give effect to certain substantive constitutional provisions and lays
out an elaborate analysis of constitutional constructivism of his own
that he claims represents a constitution-perfecting theory. Of this
analysis, Ely notes:
James Fleming is surely right in noting that the syntax of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment is most natu-
rally that of substantive entitlement. In the end I don't think this
observation fatal-it does no violence to these provisions to read
them.., as protecting rights of participation in the processes and
outputs of representative government-but at least in combination
with the libertarian instincts many of us share it makes the effort
seem worth a try.44
There is so much in this book which I find appealing. I am at-
tached to John Ely's theory that we should defer more to our legisla-
tive bodies and discourage courts from inferring rights and values
40 Rd at 16.
41 Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. RV. 631 (1991).
42 James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211
(1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution]; see alsoJames E.
Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995).
43 Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 42, at 219.
44 GROUND, supra note 1, at 307.
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where there are no clear benchmarks. And yet, I worry about such an
approach because our political world is dominated by money and
powerful special interests, and many questions important to the well-
being and functioning of our democracy reach the Supreme Court.
The case of Brown v. Board of Education4 5 is just one such example.
Having had the privilege of chairing a commission with a mission of
exploring government integrity in my own state, I was astonished by
how entrenched the status quo is and by how resistant government is
to raising its own ethical standards in areas involving conflicts of inter-
est regulation, campaign finance reform, ballot access laws, open
meetings, patronage prohibitions, whistle blower protections, pro-
curement reform, and so on.46 The impact of money on our federal
system is well-documented in the daily press concerning campaign
fund raising practices of both political parties in the last presidential
election. Former Secretary of State Elihu Root observed a long time
ago that the reason for campaign finance reform is to prevent the
great aggregations of wealth from electing members of our legislative
bodies "in order to vote for the protections and advancement of their
interests as against those of the public."47 In the face of money in
politics, is it really safe to remove the Supreme Court as the final inter-
preter with respect to the open-ended provisions of the Constitution,
especially if we agree that they have substantive content? As Ely him-
self notes, the reflection of intensities of preferences in legislative bod-
ies "is certainly far from perfect, money being the most obvious
distorting element,"48 leading him to question Buckley v. ValeA 9 and
related decisions of the Supreme Court.
It is noteworthy that Ely expresses strong concern about the func-
tioning of the legislative process in his treatment of the bill of attain-
der provision and war-making power, and elsewhere in the book.
Indeed, in his concluding chapter he suggests that Congress has
ceased being an effective policymaking alternative to the President.
"Given Congress's vanishing act," he concludes, "perhaps it is a good
thing that.., the Supreme Court... [is] being urged.., to drop the
pretense that they shouldn't behave like legislators .... Might what's
happening... [be] our best contemporary hope of approximating
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46 See John D. Feerick, Introduction to GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE
1990's: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERN-
MENT INTErRIry 1 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).
47 New York State Comm'n on Gov't Integrity, Restoring the Public Trust: A
Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18 FoRDAM URB. L.J. 173, 173 (1990).
48 GROUND, supra note 1, at 13-14.
49 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the sort of balanced system the framers envisioned?" 50 Interestingly,
Professor Ely's argument for a more limited role for the Court in deal-
ing with open-ended provisions of the Constitution contrasts with the
broad view he would have the Court take of general expressions in the
specific subject matter provisions of the Constitution involving bills of
attainder, the freedoms of expression and religion, and in areas in-
volving the rights of the criminally accused.
In a world of partisan politics and a clash of conflicting interests,
a case can be made that the judicially created (perhaps even the work
of a law clerk!) Caroline Products footnote,51 which has so heavily influ-
enced the thinking of Ely, should not be seen as the full compass of
the Supreme Court's role in judicial review. Thus, an important inter-
est is served by the debate based on interpretivism, originalism, pro-
tecting fundamental rights, and reinforcing representative
democracy.52 I have little to add to the ongoing dialogue except to
note the reflections with which I left college in 1958 as a result of my
"study" of the Constitution as an undergraduate political science ma-
jor. I was taught that Marbuiy v. Madison stood for the proposition
50 GROUND, supra note 1, at 354 (citations omitted). The importance of "balance"
in constructing a theory of the Constitution was ably articulated by my colleague,
Professor Martin S. Flaherty, in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE LJ. 1725 (1996).
51 In United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),Justice Stone setup
the following framework for a more rigorous judicial review of legislative action:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibi-
tion of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at a particular religious or national or racial minorities:
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). See the criticism of an approach based on "discrete
and insular minorities" voiced by a dissenting Justice Rehnquist in Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 656-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
52 See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Editor's Forward, 65
FoRDHAm L. REv. 1247 (1997).
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that it was the duty of the Court "to say what the law is,"53 that McCul-
loch v. Maryland 5 4 made clear the importance of the Court's reviewing
function in terms of civil peace, and that the Constitution was a "liv-
ing, evolving" charter, as evidenced by its history since 1789. Indeed, I
even find a hint of the latter in Professor Ely's discussion of the free-
dom of expression, where, in speaking of the reviewing function of
appellate judges, he states:
I hope we have left far behind the notion that 'The Law' is a list of
rules deduced in vacuo from some set of celestial principles to
which the courts have access, and therefore the bringing to bear of
empirical data, and arguments as to what practical effects the adop-
tion of a given rule would have, are somehow out of order.... Law
that does not respond to social needs cannot, nor should it, long
remain law.55
Maybe, in the final analysis, the least dangerous branch of govern-
ment offers the best hope of securing our rights and liberties. On the
other hand, Ely is surely right to insist that in construing the Constitu-
tion, the Court should speak with clarity in its pronouncements and
prod our legislative bodies to do their job in dealing with the great
moral issues of the day.
53 5 U.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marshall's opinion for the Court noted the
specialness and primacy of a written constitution, requiring courts to apply, expound,
and interpret it as "the very essence ofjudicial duty." He added:
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it,
the constitution should not be looked into? ... This is too extravagent to be
maintained. In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by
the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden
to read or to obey?
Id. at 179.
54 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819). There Marshall opined about the meaning of a
written Constitution and added:
Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked,
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That
this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not
only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the lan-
guage. Why else were some of the limitations, found in the 9th section of
the 1st article, introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted, by their
having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving
a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.
Id. at 407.
55 GROUND, supra note 1, at 159.
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II. INDICTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Among the many interesting documents contained in the book is
a letter, which Professor Ely did not send to The New York Times in
1973, taking issue with a brief filed by Solicitor General Robert Bork
which argued that the President "could not be indicted prior to being
impeached."5 6 As I vividly recall, those were difficult days, and the
prospect of President Nixon being impeached or indicted was very
much in the air. It seemed to me at the time that there was a stam-
pede going on that possibly was overlooking the fact that the Presi-
dent had his rights.57 Hence, I am not sure that General Bork's
reference was wholly out of line and without historical support. It
bears noting that the framers of the Constitution rejected the idea of
the judiciary trying cases of impeachment. Gouverneur Morris said in
the Constitutional Convention debates of September 4, 1787, that "[a ]
conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme
Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the
President after the trial of the impeachment. "58 In the state ratifying
debates, James Iredell said that impeachment was designed "to bring
great offenders to punishment" and noted that an official who is im-
peached might be liable for common law punishment if the offense
"be punishable by that law."59 Moreover, Article I, Section 3 of the
Constitution states that the judgment on impeachment "shall not ex-
tend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust, or Profit under the United
States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law."
To be sure, what is impeachable conduct and therefore within
the zone of these provisions is far from dear.60 What is clear, I sug-
gest, is that non-indictable conduct which is not connected with the
exercise of official power is beyond the scope of the impeachment
power. Immunity for the President in connection with such conduct,
as Professor Ely remarks, finds no support in the debates of the Con-
stitutional Convention.
56 Id. at 140-41.
57 See the reviewer's articles, John D. Feerick, President's 'Right' in Impeachment
Probe, N.Y. L.J., April 1, 1974, at 1, and John D. Feerick, The Hastings Impeachment
Aquitta N.Y. LJ., May 28, 1974, at 1.
58 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 500 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. Yale Univ. Press 1937)
59 4JoNATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 113-14 (2d ed. 1941)
60 SeeJohn D. Feerick, Impeaching Federaljudges: A Study of the Constitutional Provi-
sions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1970).
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III. CAMpus DISCIPLINARY RuLEs
I thank Professor Ely for including in his book a letter which he
sent to the Stanford Campus Report in 1991 and a memorandum he
sent to members of Yale University in 1971 bearing on the subject of
student disciplinary investigations and proceedings. He reflects in
these writings great sensitivity to the rights and concerns of students,
correctly noting that disciplinary proceedings "sometimes . . . can
shape the entire course of a person's life." 61 It has long seemed to me
that not enough attention is paid to this subject within our educa-
tional institutions from the standpoint of what is the right balance
between the rights of students and the needs of a community to assure
integrity. I worry at times that institutions may ignore their own re-
sponsibilities and procedures in the process of finding and pinning
guilt on an accused student and fail to take advantage of the opportu-
nity to treat an issue from an educational or pedagogical perspective.
It is deplorable, in my opinion, for an institution to accuse a student
and then to rush the student into a poorly crafted disciplinary pro-
ceeding without any meaningful assistance. A student thus chastized
will face extreme difficulty in gaining access to postgraduate school,
the professions, and government employment. Professor Ely renders
an important service by reminding us that the Bill of Rights needs to
have a life within our academic institutions.
IV. THE 1996/1997 SUPREME COURT TERM
Near the very end of the book, Professor Ely observes: "If the test
of success is whether one's theories will gain general acceptance over
time... then of course the odds are almost certain that each of us will
fail." He adds and concludes: "Perhaps we never will get the boulder
to the top of the mountain. But the struggle itself is enough to fill a
person's heart."62 John Ely must, indeed, be pleased by the recent
term of the Supreme Court, because his points of view in a number of
areas were reflected in decisions of the Court.63 Most conspicuous
61 GROUND, supra note 1, at 232.
62 GROUND, supra note 1, at 363-65.
63 See, for example, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), in
which the Court affirmed a decision declining to accept a proposed class of present
and prospective claimants. It stated that Rule 23 "must be interpreted with fidelity to
the Rules Enabling Act" and cautioned that rules of procedure "'shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.'" Id. at 2252, 2244. In Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), the Court invalidated provisions of a federal
statute which prohibited the dissemination of sexually offensive material, emphasiz-
ing that even offensive speech is covered by the First Amendment and may not be
suppressed. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), the Court made clear that an
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among the decisions was the play given to principles of federalism and
separation of powers, subjects close to his heart. Some of the more
interesting cases in terms of his writings are noted below.
A. Substantive Due Process
In Washington v. Glucksberg,6 4 the Court held that the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a right to
assisted suicide. It acknowledged that it should be cautious in ex-
panding substantive due process, because the concept is open-ended
and there exist relatively few guideposts. It said that by declaring a
right or liberty interest, it removes an issue from public debate and
legislative action, running the risk of inappropriately reflecting the
policy preferences of individual Court justices.65 In identifying a
right, said the Court, it must evaluate whether it is "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' ... and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.' "66 The Court added that although many rights
protected under due process implicate these issues of personal auton-
omy, not all personal decisions are similarly protected because per-
sonal autonomy is not a protected right in itself.67 The Court,
therefore, reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld a Washington state
statute prohibiting assisted suicide. It concluded: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted sui-
cide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a
democratic society."68 Concurring, Justice Stevens stated "that there is
indigent parent was entitled to access to an appeal, through a transcript of relevant
proceedings, in a civil case involving the loss of parental rights. In so doing, it struck
down a Mississippi law which conditioned the right of appeal on prepayment of rec-
ord fees in the amount of approximately $2,400. And, in Chandlerv. Miller, 117 S. Ct.
1295 (1997), the Court found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (as
incorporated into the Fourteenth) a state law which required candidates for public
office to pass a drug test. The Court said that the test "diminished 'personal privacy'
for a symbol's sake." Id. at 1305. The Court added: "Our precedents establish that
the proferred special need for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress
the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." RL at
1303.
64 117 S. CL 2258 (1997).
65 See id. at 2267-68.
66 Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
67 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
68 Id. at 2275.
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also room for further debate about the limits that the Constitution
places on the power of the States to punish the practice." 69
B. Federalism
In Printz v. United States,70 the Court invalidated the Brady Act
because it required individual state officials to regulate the sale of
guns. The Court stated that federal laws imposing regulatory schemes
upon states is not supported by the structure of the Constitution, his-
tory, and the Court's jurisprudence. It stated that such an imposition
violates the concept of federalism and thereby erodes a significant
structural protection of liberty by which the Constitution prevents an
excessive accumulation of power in any one branch. The Court also
said that such impositions violate the concept of separation of powers
by denying the President his responsibility to supervise the faithful
execution of the laws and represent a further accumulation of power
by Congress unto itself, risking the road to tyranny against which the
Constitution was designed to guard. Thus, while Congress can itself
regulate the sale of guns via its commerce clause powers, the Court
said that it cannot force a regulatory scheme upon state officials. Said
Justice Scalia: "When a 'La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution' the
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected
in the various constitutional provisions[,] .. .it is not. . . 'proper for
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the
words of The Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'de-
serve [s] to be treated as such.'"71 In so finding, the Court responded
to a plea contained in On Constitutional Ground that there should be
some limits placed on the commerce power in the interest of federal-
ism. Ely noted that "the root explanation of runaway federal
power.., is the seeming illimitabiltiy of the commerce power, for
which no one has been able to define a principled cutoff, at least not
one with serious teeth."72
C. Presidential Immunity
In Clinton v. Jones,73 the Court found that a sitting President does
not have immunity from a private action for civil damages. In the
course of its decision, the Court said that presidential immunity ap-
plies only to the performance of official functions and that such litiga-
69 Id. at 2304.
70 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
71 Id. at 2379 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)).
72 GROUND, supra note 1, at 38.
73 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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tion, as vexing as it may be, does not rise to the level of a separation of
powers risk.74 The outcome in this highly-publicized case accords
with the views expressed by Ely in a 1973 memorandum to Archibald
Cox on the legality of calling President Nixon before a grand jury, to
wit: "The 'convention' that the president cannot be called before a
grand jury, let alone that he is generally immune to the judicial pro-
cess, seems very faint indeed."75 He adds in a footnote in the book
with respect to the then-pending Clinton v. Jones lawsuit "We've come
far enough toward the sort of regal presidency the framers abhorred
without effectively immunizing behavior of the sort alleged ... ."76
D. Religious Freedom
Three cases involving the religion clauses of the Constitution are
noteworthy because of the element of federalism expressed by the
outcomes in the cases. In City of Boerne v. Flores,77 the Court invali-
dated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was
passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Di-
vision, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.78 In Smith, the Court
upheld an Oregon statute prohibiting the use of peyote, among other
narcotics, in the face of a free exercise challenge by Native Americans.
In its Boerne decision, the Court said that it alone had the power to
declare the constitutional ight to free exercise of religion and that
Congress does not have the power to alter the substantive meaning of
the Constitution's guarantee in this area. Such power would enable
legislative majorities to evade the amendment process and place legis-
lative acts on the same level as constitutional provisions. The Court
concluded that there was no need for so sweeping an act as that
passed by Congress imposing such burdens upon states.
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,79 the Court upheld a law
of Minnesota prohibiting fusion candidacies through the vehicle of
multi-party nominees. Although First and Fourteenth Amendment as-
sociational rights were implicated, the Court found the burdens im-
posed by the state law to be of a lesser variety and not sufficient when
balanced against the regulatory interests of the state. The Court
stated: "States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity,
74 Id. at 1645-50.
75 GROUND, supra note 1, at 138.
76 Id. at 415 n.183.
77 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
78 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
79 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
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fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and election processes as
means for electing public officials."8 0
In Agostini v. Felton,81 the Court found that providing services on
parochial premises under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act
of 1965 did not constitute an excessive entanglement with religion.
The Court said that it had rejected the notion in earlier cases that a
public employee on sectarian premises is presumed to inculcate reli-
gion in her work and symbolizes a union between church and state.8 2
It noted that the public aid in question reached sectarian institutions
as a result of private decisions and that the services were provided
based on neutral criteria. Quite clearly, the Supreme Court has
adopted the theory and language of neutrality suggested by Professor
Ely with respect to its treatment of the religion clauses.88
E. Reverse Discrimination
In Abrams v. Johnson,84 the Supreme Court held that race cannot
be a predominant factor in drawing district lines favorable to minori-
ties. The Court upheld a plan formulated by the district court which
contained only one majority-minority district, instead of two as pre-
ferred by the state legislature, because creating a second would have
amounted to subordinating the state's traditional districting policies
and considering race predominately. Given his thoughtful treatment
of the subject of reverse discrimination, Professor Ely would not have
been surprised by the outcome in this case, although he has suggested
a different approach in reviewing racial classifications that advantage
minorities:
When the group that controls the decision making process classifies
so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for
being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a strin-
gent brand of review, are lacking. A white majority is unlikely to
disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to
be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of whites
relative to those of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an
80 Id. at 1373.
81 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
82 See id. at 2010.
83 In On Constitutional Ground, Professor Ely notes that "[t]here is no constitu-
tional bar to helping or hindering religious persons or groups along with otherwise
similarly situated persons or groups. Deviation from neutrality occurs only when reli-
gion or a religion is singled out for advancement or inhibition." GROUND, supra note
1, at 195.
84 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
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alternative classification that would extend to certain whites the ad-
vantages generally extended to blacks.8 5
In contrast to what the Court did in Abrams, Ely has observed:
"Measures that favor racial minorities pose a difficult moral question
that should, by one method or the other, be left to the states. There is
nothing suspicious about a majority's discriminating against itself,
though we must never relent in our vigilance lest something masquer-
ading as that should in fact be something else."86
In the coming term of the Supreme Court87 the issue of affirma-
tive action will present itself, and Professor Ely's views on that subject
will have an important test. On this subject, he has written: "[I]f we
are to have any hope of defeating racial prejudice we will, at least for a
time, have to take race into account for some purposes"; and:
[T]he question is whether the negative educative effects of using
racial criteria to overcome centuries of discrimination are so inevita-
ble, and so threatening, as to outweigh the good that such programs
may accomplish. It is a difficult question, but the basis for an af-
firmative answer can hardly be secure enough to support an abso-
lute declaration of constitutional impermissibility. 8 8
V. CONCLUSION
I am grateful for the opportunity to review this book. It has re-
newed my passion for constitutional law and for delving into constitu-
tional theory. But more than that it- has made me appreciate more
fully one of America's greatest constitutionalists and an outstanding
member of the legal profession. John Hart Ely can be rightly proud of
the role he has played as a lawyer and teacher and of his own contri-
butions to making "the American Dream more broadly accessible than
it had ever been before."8 9 I applaud him for this volume and wish
him continued heavy lifting in the law. I know that there. are many
issues of contemporary interest on which he has not yet published a
view. Given the esteem in which he is held by all who know him and
85 GROUND, supra note 1, at 272.
86 GROUND, supra note 1, at 275; see also James Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 723 (1974). For a most thoughtful
treatment of increasing the representation of minorities in the Senate, see the article
by my colleague, Professor Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The
Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1996).
87 Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Gir. 1996), cert. granted, 65
U.S.L.W. 3354, 3849, 3860 (U.S.June 27, 1997) (No. 96-679).
88 GROUND, supra note 1, at 273, 274.
89 Id. (speaking of Chief Justice Earl Warren).
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by others like me from afar, I await with interest his future writings, in
whatever form.
